Promoting “Orderly and Sound Growth”: 1960s Debates Over Administering Public Transportation in Service of Mobility or Regional Planning

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Abstract
This article reconstructs debates within the Kennedy and Johnson administrations regarding the management of U.S. public transportation. Should transit be treated as a component of the mobility system, or as a tool of land-use planning? In the midst of jurisdictional battles triggered by the formation of two new departments, officials fiercely disagreed about this question and adapted their practices to gain the upper hand. I document how interest in organizing metropolitan growth and concerns about destructive road projects helped justify national housing agencies managing transit programs beginning in 1961. But Congress shifted them to the Department of Transportation in 1968. This was due, I argue, to lingering racist, anti-urban sentiments about housing-agency programs benefiting low-income people and transportation officials previously focused on highways devoting newfound attention to multimodal projects. Despite a fleeting moment of attention to regional land-use and transportation policy, this change ultimately bifurcated and diminished federal planning oversight.

Keywords
public transportation, regional planning, federal government organization, 1960s

Among the many new programs advanced during Lyndon Johnson’s administration was a major investment in urban transit. After decades during which public transportation was sidelined in favor of highway construction, the U.S. federal government committed for the first time to a long-term infusion of funds to support the planning and construction of new bus and rail routes. Like other elements of the Great Society, these programs targeted ills then affecting U.S. cities, including urban sprawl, white flight, environmental degradation, poverty, and traffic congestion. Officials in Washington, though, were confronted with a question that went beyond funding: who should manage public transportation investments, the federal housing agency or the transportation one?

Today, U.S. public transit programs are managed by the Department of Transportation (DOT) rather than the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), an outcome rooted in a
decade-long oscillation of institutional organization within the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. This article reconstructs the political conflicts that settled this question, and it shows that this jurisdictional debate reflected a broader disagreement about whether transit was primarily a tool for organizing land use, or, alternatively, an element of the national mobility system.

I focus on three questions that illustrate shifts in how officials thought about the relationship between mobility and urban development in the 1960s. First, I ask why transit programs were initially assigned to the Housing and Home Finance Agency (HHFA) and its successor, HUD, rather than the Department of Commerce (Commerce), which was then supervising highway expenditures. I argue that a broad consensus about the importance of regional planning, combined with a growing interest in integrating land use and transportation—note interdependencies between transit, urban renewal, and housing programs— informed this choice. I also show that the destructive aspects of contemporary federal roadbuilding raised concerns about the ability of highway officials to achieve such integration.

Second, I ask how transit programs’ short-lived location within housing agencies influenced the shape of investment. How did HHFA and HUD manage transit programs during the 1960s? I show that agency leaders attempted to integrate transit grants with multi-jurisdictional regional plans, and focused investments in low-income, minority communities suffering from decades of underinvestment. The housing agencies, however, were never able to expand their jurisdictions into all elements of transportation, such as highway planning, and HUD’s administrative organization undermined the potential links between public transportation and its housing and urban development programs.

Third, I ask why transit programs were shifted to DOT in 1968. I analyze executive-branch debates to highlight the logics used to justify this choice. I show that HUD’s failure to demonstrate how it integrated transportation into its broader work, combined with anti-urban and racist views of many lawmakers, contributed to the agency’s delegitimization as an effective mechanism to promote policy just two years into its existence. Simultaneously, DOT’s leaders showed themselves ready to abandon the roadbuilding emphasis of predecessor agencies, expressing attentiveness to planning urban transport from a new perspective integrating land use, while supporting multimodal mobility at the state level. Moving transit out of HUD ultimately limited that agency’s ability to shape development patterns because it brought about a bifurcation of authority over regional planning between HUD and DOT.

Throughout this period, there was occasional talk of administratively integrating transportation and land use, but in practice the option never manifested; these policies were—and continue to be—overseen by different agencies. Despite a yearning for a comprehensive vision incorporating the two, debates about the stewardship of the transit program focused on territorial claims over which agency would best manage it. With attention directed to that jurisdictional fight, more transformative proposals such as installing all transportation and land-use programs within one department fell by the wayside.

This cut off an opportunity to subvert the primacy of automobiles in shaping urban form. The irony is that, when it came to highways rather than transit, federal transport investment already functioned as a de facto land-use policy. The construction of the Interstate highway system facilitated the twentieth-century trends of suburban land development and central-city disinvestment. Even as highway engineers left “little room for land-use or aesthetic criteria” in their creation of a car-based “socio-technical system,” they left in their path the framework for a society literally rebuilt around motor vehicles. Other changes, such as technological innovation and cultural preferences, also spurred that transformation, to be sure, but government subsidies for cars played a key role. Federal investments were propelled by a “highway federalism” that “insinuated” the power of those connected with road construction into American culture, but also into state and federal law, and into state and local agencies that sprung up as “creatures of the national state.” Through the “idea of apolitical expertise” of state highway engineers, federal spending reinforced the joint
goals of building roads and recreating adjacent landscapes—paving over neighborhoods, spurring sprawl, and reducing transit use.5

In the 1960s, federal leaders had the opportunity to redress the failings of the highway-based transportation/land-use nexus by increasing urban transit investment and directly tying it to land-use policy. Doing so, however, would have required new jurisdictional arrangements strong enough to challenge automobile-promoting economic and political interests, and the carefully constructed federal-state relationship that buttressed societal transformations around highways. The administrative choice of bifurcating transportation and land use reinforced jurisdictional walls between agencies and prevented the federal government from countering automobile dependence through effective regional planning.

This work provides a new account of how the transit program came into existence during the 1960s, eventually shaping today’s institutional arrangements. It shows how federal officials understood the intersection between land use and transportation. To develop this history, I inspected letters, documents, and oral histories of presidents, their aides, and departmental officials at the libraries of John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson. I studied materials from the Dwight Eisenhower Library and National Archives assembled by Jeff Davis. I also examined files of New Jersey Senators Clifford P. Case and Harrison “Pete” A. Williams, who led efforts to fund transit during the 1960s.6


In the early 1960s, Washington took its first steps toward developing permanent transit programs. But this process exposed an underlying disagreement over whether the purpose of transit policy should be to extend the national mobility system or to advance metropolitan policy related to land use, urban renewal, and housing. This debate produced a turf war between transportation and housing agencies; some officials supported the view that transit investments should be distributed by Commerce—then allocating highway funds—whereas others saw merit in allowing HHFA to manage them, because of its experience in urbanism. In this section, I explore why a growing interest in integrating transportation into regional planning, plus concerns about the negative impacts of urban roadbuilding, encouraged the initial placement of transit programs within the housing agency.

A Nation in Need of Solutions, Both for Land Use and Transportation

In the postwar period, control over federal roads funding resided in the Bureau of Public Roads (BPR), part of Commerce. BPR managed the rollout of the 41,000-mile Interstate Highway System, passed by Congress in 1956 and financed by the Highway Trust Fund. This federal support bolstered the institutional power of the state highway departments that were the recipients of most funding. The two levels of government worked as a tag team to reshape the nation’s transportation systems. In the process, they also reshaped its land uses around roadways—but mostly as an indirect afterthought.7

Since at least 1936,8 the concept of a cabinet-level agency to manage transportation, including surface, aviation, and maritime modes, had been discussed, but no progress was made other than centralizing their administration in separate agencies under Commerce.9 The federal government’s investments in public transportation were haphazard and slight. Streetcars and commuter railroads in the nineteenth century were largely built and operated privately. Only in the 1930s and 1940s did the Public Works Administration fund transit, such as Chicago’s State Street Subway.10 But that investment was unsystematic; public transportation lacked an institutional home.
In the 1950s, however, social and economic change made it apparent that urban transportation—and the urban system as a whole—was breaking down. First, cities suffered from declining population and underinvestment partly brought on by the departure of (largely white) middle- and higher-income families to suburbs. Induced by loans from the Federal Housing Administration and highway construction, the postwar economic boom encouraged sprawl. Second, relatedly, traffic spiked on metropolitan roads as car ownership increased and new developments, such as strip malls and culs-de-sac, were designed around cars. Third, private transit was losing its marketability. Between 1954 and 1963, almost 200 U.S. transit companies were abandoned, their fates sealed by travelers’ access to new transport modes. Local governments stepped in to oversee bus and rail lines, but did so on often shoestring budgets and little commitment to long-term expansion to meet growing metropolitan needs.

Washington’s focus on highways was concretized through institutional support from the roads-only BPR. Benefiting from federal expenditures, state governments insisted that they retain power to direct roads construction, and they opposed the use of highway funds for non-automobile modes. But critics, such as neighborhood associations in such cities as Boston and San Francisco, rose up against new roads that would demolish their communities. Republican senator Case, first elected in 1954, noted that highway aid was destroying cities, even as they needed public assistance for their reconstruction:

> It does not make sense . . . for the Federal government, on the one hand, to spend millions of dollars to fight slums and decaying city centers [through urban renewal], only, on the other hand, to take other steps which tend to promote the spread of blight in the same communities.

For Senator Williams, a Democrat first elected in 1958, the situation produced perverse outcomes. Increasingly impoverished cities, suffering from declining tax bases, would theoretically be the best locations for new public transportation. Due to inadequate federal assistance, however, they were instead forced to focus their limited local funds to “rising welfare costs.” Moreover, he noted,

> Our ability to move large numbers of commuters in rapid transit vehicles is dwindling. Instead, we are relying—even for rush-hour transportation—on automobiles and highways, the most costly and least efficient method of moving people.

Combined, these factors set the table for federal transit investment in the late 1950s. Although Eisenhower administration officials viewed urban transport as “primarily a local problem,” White House assistant Robert Merriam argued that federal funds “resulted in States and municipalities becoming highway-oriented,” and thus suggested allowing those governments to reallocate roads assistance for transit. Congressional leaders, too, pointed to some possibilities. Case sponsored a bill providing loans for commuter railroads to purchase trains. He argued that railroad companies should have to justify cuts to service—a concern for his suburban constituents. Williams, too, focused his attention on directing federal support to better transit. In 1960, he introduced legislation that would deliver grants for comprehensive urban transportation planning and loans for transit facilities. Williams argued that “the planning of local transportation facilities is an inseparable and vital part of overall urban planning and redevelopment”; he thus proposed locating such grants within HHFA, not Commerce.

These efforts can be contextualized in an interest in metropolitan planning then permeating Congress. The 1949 Housing Act required local urban renewal and development agencies to create “workable programs” articulating long-term, “area-wide” investment plans. The 1954 act allowed HHFA to fund planning through the 701 program. The Eisenhower administration evaluated metropolitan cooperation through intergovernmental relationships, including through
a series of ad hoc interagency discussions. These discussions related to transit because most such systems were metropolitan in scale, not limited to one municipality; planning them meant thinking beyond city limits.

A Push for a Department of Urban Affairs by the Kennedy Administration

Before and during his presidency, John F. Kennedy viewed transit (meaning buses and trains) as worth funding as a complement to land-use issues; as such, he envisioned its inclusion in a general urban department. But members of Congress and some within the administration disagreed about transit’s role, with many proposing that it be understood, instead, primarily as a form of mobility. Moreover, the possibility of integrating land use and all modes of transportation (including roads) in one department was ignored.

The administrative position of transit funding, if there was to be any, was actively debated. Faced with a jurisdictional battle between HHFA and Commerce, White House staff deferred judgment. For some officials, public transportation was obviously a mobility question; to position it within HHFA would be antithetical to this purpose. Dwight Palmer, New Jersey transportation commissioner, wrote:

[Transportation] is a specialized field outside the province or the knowledge of the Housing Administration . . . transportation studies and their application have for years been fundamentals of the highway industry and on the basis of facts rather than on guesswork much of the other master planning, I am informed, has been done. Here in our own State the example was set by placing the responsibility for mass transit in the Highway Department . . . [HHFA is] an inexperienced group rather than where the experience now exists [in BPR].

From this perspective, planning transit meant engineering movement, addressed by calculating travel patterns and considering modal options—not considering land use. Case’s continual reintroduction of legislation to form DOT reflected this view. More than anything, he thought, bus and rail lines needed to be coordinated with highways and other forms of mobility. Similarly, for their part, Commerce leaders believed that HHFA should focus on the “more pressing planning needs for which it is responsible.”

Others disagreed with this understanding. The National Housing Conference argued that HHFA’s connections with municipalities were essential to transit planning. And Kennedy’s predisposition was to link land use and public transportation. While he dismissed calls for a DOT, he had proposed a Department of Urban Affairs during the 1960 campaign; a transition report in December that year concluded that he should establish a “Department of Housing and Urban Development.” This would include HHFA and “responsibility for any Federal program of aid to local urban mass transportation,” but not highways. Bus and rail services would be integrated with urban affairs because such transport “determines the pattern of location of people and industry”; highways apparently did not.

Once in the White House, staff recognized links between various programs manifesting on city streets. Assistant Frederick G. Dutton, for example, noted the need for public housing to rehouse people displaced by highways. A new department would “contribute to sound physical development” and “provide for the integration of urban development with transportation facilities,” according to advocates in HHFA. Williams supported this view, arguing that comprehensive planning to “create better total environments” would include urban renewal, housing, open space, and transit.

As discussions about the new agency advanced, Williams insisted that transit programs be administered by HHFA. For him, coordination with public housing and urban renewal was more important than coordination with highways; moreover, transit needed to be planned at the outset
of urban land-use plans, not after development projects were “locked in.” “It seems evident that HHFA,” he argued to White House staff, “because of its jurisdiction over most of the programs affecting urban land use, is the only agency.” Commerce was too focused on highways and had “no more experience in the field of mass transportation than does HHFA.” Williams wrote to Palmer, “inasmuch as a mass transportation system can have an enormous impact on urban land use developments and, conversely, land use developments can have an enormous impact on [transit’s] success,” HHFA should lead.33

Williams was unconvinced by the potential benefits of implanting transit within Commerce. “There appears to be a vague hope that somehow this massive highway program can someday be broadened so that the funds going into urban areas can be used for all forms of transportation, highways and mass transportation,” he wrote to presidential assistant Lee C. White. But Commerce was “a conservative agency, especially in Republican years, which has never been very interested in urban areas.” Handing Commerce transit would reduce its relevance to planning in the face of highway dominance. The fact that Williams served on the Senate Banking Committee—which oversaw HHFA—rather than the Commerce Committee (which oversaw BPR) likely also influenced his thinking.34

Positioning transit under HHFA linked to Williams’s goals for metropolitan planning. The senator had also sponsored open-space legislation designed to concentrate development and limit the deleterious impacts of sprawl, including high costs for school construction, streets, and sewers. Transit was the mobility component of a generalized fight against outward development. Williams contended that “my mass transportation and open space bills give explicit priority to those applicants . . . in the crucial area of comprehensive planning—which is indispensable if we are to avoid a waste of public expenditures.”35

Despite his seeming agreement with the administration on transit’s land-use links, Williams made little progress in advancing legislation to fund transit under HHFA. In early 1961, he proposed a bill requiring comprehensive planning associated with transit. But Kennedy aides were concerned about the scale of Williams’s pitch—$325 million over three years—and asked him to reduce it by two-thirds. But that bill failed, too, in part because of the administration’s concerns about upsetting Commerce.36

Even so, the government took halting steps forward. The Housing Act of 1961 established loans and grants for transit agencies, the first federal program explicitly funding transit agencies, rather than individual infrastructure projects. It also expanded the 701 planning program to include transportation; all would be HHFA-supervised.37 Kennedy sent a separate urban transportation bill to Congress in June. The president emphasized to House Speaker Sam Rayburn that transit “is a distinctly urban problem and one of the key factors in shaping community development.” Thus, the bill would instruct HHFA to appropriate funds in the context of comprehensive plans and metropolitan transportation providers.38

By October, White House officials concluded that transportation was part and parcel of comprehensive planning. For Special Assistant Dutton, HHFA had “the most substantial series of programs affecting the development of metropolitan communities,” and thus it was the right landing spot for a diversity of federal activities related to cities—including transportation, though road-based transportation remained off-limits for HHFA or a future urban department.39

**Cooperation between Commerce and HHFA—and the Potential for Multimodality**

As debates about jurisdiction over transit continued, members of various executive branch agencies found ways to cooperate. At the conclusion of the Eisenhower administration, Commerce and HHFA agreed to jointly sponsor planning funds for metropolitan area development.40 In 1961, the agencies began studying transit collaboration, a short-lived initiative
nonetheless indicative of institutional change. The sense that transportation was a means to promote effective urban planning as well as mobility was growing within Commerce; it was not the roads-only agency of the past.

The agencies’ report noted “a new era of common thought between these agencies,” with no “preference of one method of transportation over another.” This multimodal perspective suggested complementary transit and highways. Commerce secretary Luther Hodges and HHFA administrator Robert C. Weaver wrote Kennedy, “we must be sure that transportation planning and construction are integral parts of general development planning and programming,” which would advance “sound land-use patterns, the assurance of transportation facilities for all segments of the population, the improvement in overall traffic flow.” In agreement, Assistant White wrote that the administration did not want “the various forms of transportation fighting.”

The 1962 Federal-Aid Highway Act continued in this spirit, requiring Commerce to guarantee that states account for local needs and consider transit, and establishing funding for a transport and land-use planning process via metropolitan planning organizations (MPOs) created in each region (these agencies often acted as offshoots of state DOTs). But this set up a new conflict: now, both Commerce and HHFA ran regional planning programs.

The concept of metropolitan plans as fundamental to transportation planning—a bipartisan idea shared among academics and lawmakers—informed debate on transit’s institutional setting. Robert C. Wood, in 1960 a Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) politics professor, argued for “workable plan[s]” of comprehensive development. Weaver agreed that “political boundaries are meaningless when it comes to the most effective and economical performance of certain functional activities.” Case, though focused on creating a DOT, argued that such plans acknowledged that “city lines [were] becoming increasingly obliterated by the proliferating problems of highways location, urban redevelopment, [and] transportation.” Williams, finally, wrote that plans could ensure highways were “located and designed in such a way as to do minimum damage to the social and economic fabric of the community.” Still, despite these integrative ambitions of many policymakers, the ability to integrate transportation and land use had been degraded by Congress’s choice to direct HHFA and Commerce to develop planning programs, and the fact that there was no clear path ahead for combined housing, highway, and future transit grants.

How HHFA Won the Day, at First

In early 1962, White House staff were promoting a Department of Urban Affairs and Housing. The agency’s prospects were tenuous; Republican leadership indicated party members would oppose it. But the administration advanced nonetheless. Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy wrote the president to explain how reorganization would occur. The new department would assume HHFA’s responsibilities and therefore take on what limited transit financing it oversaw. For Robert Kennedy,

Widely different as these Federal programs are in subject matter and in technique, they all affect the lives and welfare of families in our cities and their surrounding areas, and they all impinge in one degree or another on each other. None can or should stand by itself.”

As Congress mulled over the potential reorganization in 1962, the president, now fully on board, asked Williams to sponsor a three-year, $500 million bill to create an Urban Mass Transportation Administration (UMTA) within HHFA. Weaver later noted that Williams “almost single-handedly got that bill” advanced, and that its jurisdictional location was confirmed after several White House meetings in which top administration officials “decided that . . . HHFA was where mass transit should be, as a part of our” 701 planning program. The bill would fund transit capital expenses, allowing agencies to improve service and reestablish profitability—an infusion
of money for an industry that had underinvested for decades. Williams remained convinced that private transit operations—at least for commuter rail—should be prioritized. In a transportation message delivered to Congress that April, President Kennedy, too, emphasized his interest in encouraging private profits and competition.

The 1962 legislation failed, partly due to strong opposition from Ohio Democratic senator Frank Lausche, who, despite language used by Kennedy and Williams, worried about transit nationalization and prioritized its mobility component. Lausche thought transit funds should be appropriated by a new Commerce Division of Urban Transportation alongside BPR, but this, too, had insufficient support. While Congress members were unprepared to expand support for transit, they were also not ready to pull it from HHFA; they valued the budding link between urban development and transportation.

The year 1963 started off on a better note. Williams again introduced his legislation, S.6, this time with Case’s support. It would provide a two-thirds federal match for transit capital projects, again with plans for distribution by HHFA. For the first time, the bill had real uptake, perhaps because of Kennedy’s pressure; Senate leadership scheduled hearings, to Williams’s surprise. The legislation would require transit programs’ coordination with regional plans, with the intention of curbing sprawl, remedying suburban development, and bolstering declining cities.

Williams’s legislation was still challenged, though. Wisconsin Democratic senator William Proxmire, a fiscal hawk on the Banking and Appropriations committees, reasoned that cities were wealthy and could improve transit themselves; federal intervention would dig a “bottomless pit” of spending, rather than enforce “hard, tough [fiscal] discipline.” Moreover, he questioned why transit was needed; “isn’t it possible that many of these cities have outgrown mass transportation in the automobile era?” Texas Republican John Tower worried about giving more power to HHFA, when it had not solved “decay, crime, poor living conditions, dirt, and other undesirable elements” over which it had jurisdiction. Instead of grants, private transit providers should get tax benefits, according to Lausche. Williams’s proposed grants were “contrary to the American way of life . . . if S.6 is enacted, there will be no turning back—nationalization of the railroads will, in the not too distant future, be a fait accompli.”

South Carolina senator Strom Thurmond—then a Democrat—claimed that the federal government lacked constitutional authority to engage in local policy. Moreover, some Republican senators complained that the legislation, despite involving transportation, had not been referred to the Commerce Committee. Yet, these efforts to undermine the bill failed. An amendment eliminating preexisting transit assistance was defeated 41-57 in the Senate. A Lausche amendment to transfer programs to the Commerce Department failed 33-62, reinforcing the general agreement with Williams’s view on the need to integrate transit with HHFA and thus conceptualize transit as related to land use.

After the transit program was downscaled to $375 million, in April 1963, the legislation passed 52-41, with six Republicans (including Case and the New York Senators) joining forty-six Democrats. The bill was delayed in the House, but after Lyndon Johnson ascended to the presidency on November 22, the Congress was invigorated to undertake policies Kennedy had failed to complete. Both chambers approved the legislation (passing the House 212-129), and Johnson signed the law on July 9, 1964. UMTA, under HHFA’s management, was now a permanent fixture of the federal government.

UMTA’s creation bolstered HHFA’s effort to integrate mobility and land use. The legislation noted that “the welfare and vitality of urban areas, the satisfactory movement of people and goods within such areas, and the effectiveness of housing, urban renewal, highway, and other federally aided programs are being jeopardized by the deterioration or inadequate provision of urban transportation.” Congress was instructing HHFA staff to contribute to all these
objectives. But Commerce’s involvement in highways, and the sprawling land uses those roads produced, continued to loom in the background.  

**Administering Urban Transportation in Line with Land-Use Planning**

UMTA and its successor, the Federal Transit Administration (FTA), have perdured for more than half a century. As important as the institution’s continued presence, however, are the choices it makes regarding the orientation of its investments. In this section, I consider how HHFA and its successor HUD managed the transit program. I show that many officials within the housing agencies—and Commerce—linked rail and bus projects to regional planning. For a fleeting moment, closely integrating land-use and transportation policy seemed possible. Yet, progress was undermined due to the HUD’s failure to integrate transit fully into its other programs and rising interest in creating a DOT.

**Transit as a Tool for Urbanism**

HHFA had some guidance from above about managing its embryonic transit programs. In a letter to Hodges and Weaver, Kennedy wrote that transportation is an essential element to the direction and form that the growth of our modern urban communities will take. Urban transit, therefore, must be planned in relation to the kind of communities we need, and Federal assistance . . . will be productive only to the extent that state and local planning and resources are focused on the total urban area.  

HHFA officials agreed, focusing on transit as a tool for urbanism. HHFA assistant administrator Sidney Spector noted, “highways, urban renewal, hospitals, public housing, airports, schools and other community facilities must be provided on a coordinated basis as part of an overall plan.” Appropriate growth could only be achieved “through careful and joint planning of urban development and mass transportation.” Federal officials were backed by local leaders. New York mayor Robert F. Wagner Jr., for example, had earlier emphasized that HHFA management of transit “will enable a degree of coordination of land development that has not previously existed.”

If it was clear to many that there was a connection between land-use development and transit, the question of how to manage road planning was less obvious, as we saw from the failure to address them in the run-up to UMTA’s creation. From one perspective, highways were intercity and national by nature—the highway system was named “Interstate” for a reason—and, thus, their planning might seem isolated from urban growth concerns (despite the undeniable evidence of their land-use impacts). However, to provide city-to-city connections, new highways passed through cities, and in the process of doing so, they impacted the form and function of those places.

Having seen the devastation highways wrought on such cities as Newark, Case was amenable to the idea that roads, too, should be managed through regional planning, even as he pushed for a DOT. In a letter to Weaver, he asked, “why should federal funds be spent on urban roads without regard to overall community growth, when federal funds are being committed to the same community for housing and urban renewal purposes?” Williams, too, argued that highways “ideally” should be treated more as a tool for the broad improvement of the urban area than as a means of meeting interstate traffic needs.” Municipalities could leverage the connections they had built with the federal government through HHFA, allowing them to better contest the power of state highway departments, themselves little interested in transit and willing to destroy urban neighborhoods for the sake of intercity travel.
HHFA’s stance about comprehensive planning was inclusive—all modes, from transit to highways, were relevant to urban form. At the same time, officials in Commerce who thought of highways as tools to benefit cities were gaining influence. And leaders from outside the department were encouraging it to change its approach. Kennedy asked Secretary Hodges to ensure that highway planning related to “comprehensive community development plan[s].”71 Williams encouraged this, too, arguing that comprehensive plans should involve “all modes.” Land use should be “coordinated with transit and highway plans,” or it “could well turn out to be much less effective.”72

**Under Johnson, Urban Affairs Becomes HUD—but Its Powers Were Limited**

One way to encourage integration between land use and transportation could have been to task one agency to lead planning, or fund programs, in both areas. Yet, both Commerce and HHFA oversaw regional plan creation, and they allocated grants for different transportation modes. Moreover, the Kennedy administration had failed to advance the Department of Urban Affairs. Part of the opposition came from state governors threatened by amplified direct federal links to localities.73 Others who protested the reorganization had racist motives; one Kennedy idea—that Weaver might be appointed secretary (he would be the first Black person heading a cabinet agency)—bothered some lawmakers, convinced that an “urban” department would primarily aid minority people.74 Kennedy persisted in 1963,75 but by the time of his assassination in November, he had made little progress. Presidential Assistant White, who also served in the Johnson administration, argued that rural lawmakers, uninterested in urban affairs, and the home-building industry, worried about access to the semi-independent Federal Housing Administration, stood in the way.76

Still, the Johnson administration redoubled efforts to advance a department focused on urban issues. Reinforced by HHFA’s progress, throughout 1964, staff held discussions behind the scenes. Buoyed by the president’s landslide election the previous November, officials in 1965 announced plans for HUD—named to “emphasize the Department’s concern with the development (but not other ‘affairs’ of large and small urban areas).”77 Just how involved it might be in mobility was initially unclear.

Amid the groundswell for Great Society legislation and massive Democratic majorities in both chambers, the act creating the agency passed the House 217-184 in June and the Senate 57-33 in August, with Case and Williams in support, and a familiar cast of characters, including Lausche, opposed.79 Johnson signed the law on September 9. The basic principle underlying HUD’s activities was to continue HHFA’s mission, just now with the legitimacy of a cabinet position. HUD was also reinforced by the almost-simultaneous passage of the 1965 Housing and Urban Development Act. This $7.5 billion law expanded urban renewal and housing programs, and doubled the size of the 701 planning program.79 But Weaver, not yet secretary, cautioned that HUD’s planning would not put the agency “in a position of exercising a veto over the actions of a wide variety of other Federal agencies.”80

The president was more ambitious regarding HUD involvement in transportation, wanting to move past HHFA’s concentration on housing.81 A presidential task force emphasized that metropolitan mobility, especially for those who could not afford cars, should be a major initiative. Harry McPherson, a White House assistant, supported integrating transportation, housing, and land-use planning, noting that HUD’s jurisdiction should include “policy determination over highways in urban areas—whether and where they should be built.”82 In January 1966, upon the East Room swearing-in of Weaver as HUD secretary and Wood as undersecretary, the president said, “it will no longer be enough merely to provide housing for people.”83 For now, though, HUD supervision of roads remained speculative.
This intra-executive branch conversation about expanding HUD's role was manifested in internal discussions about agency organization throughout fall 1965. In November, Weaver proposed four assistant secretaries, including one for Community and Metropolitan Development overseeing transit, planning, public works, and public facilities assistance. But in Wood's view, "physical facilities" (urban renewal, public housing, and a new Office of Metropolitan Transportation Planning) should be integrated to prevent siloing transit from broader agency concerns. Like McPherson, Wood proposed that HUD determine road location, though BPR would oversee highway construction.

The administration ultimately pursued Weaver's more cautious approach. White House Bureau of the Budget chief Charles Schultze deferred handing HUD control of highway planning. And he separated assistant secretary positions, identifying one for urban renewal and housing, and another for metropolitan development, incorporating planning, transit, and public facilities. This organization limited HUD's efforts to link its jurisdiction over land use and transit, which could have meant, for example, planning transit lines, affordable housing, and redevelopment simultaneously.

By 1966, HUD was up and running. But it lacked the widespread jurisdiction over all matters of urban affairs President Kennedy had once envisioned. Although it was tasked with mass transit grants, it failed to fully link those to its other priorities in housing and land use because of an administrative choice. And though it was involved in regional planning, Commerce continued to supervise its own planning programs—and retained full control over highway spending.

**DOT’s Creation**

HUD’s limited ability to take on the breadth of urban issues offered an opening for those who remained convinced that the federal government needed to concentrate transportation policy in a new agency. This again raised questions about whether HUD should retain jurisdiction over transit. Indeed, in 1965, Case reaffirmed the idea of a DOT, convinced as he was that more federal investment was needed in the context of inadequate freeway capacity and fiscally stressed commuter rail agencies. Most transportation policy, though, remained at Commerce, where it was of second-order importance.

Commerce secretary John T. Connor—also a New Jerseyan—agreed in a letter to Johnson that coordinated, “comprehensive transportation policy formulation has continuously eluded us.” Alan Boyd, Commerce undersecretary for transportation, found his position “unworkable,” with transportation losing out in the face of other department priorities, and recommended a DOT to presidential aide Joseph Califano in October 1965. That fall, White House staff agreed in principle to creating a new department to handle transportation. What remained to work out, though, was the nature of this department’s relationship to HUD, and the position that transit would occupy between them.

As early as January 4, 1966, Boyd argued that DOT should incorporate both urban highway and urban transit programs, as well as the federal government’s other transportation initiatives, such as those related to railroads, aviation, and sea trade. Califano was un convinced, however; he wrote to Connecticut senator Abraham Ribicoff: “We are still trying to work this out.” Everyone seemed to agree that HUD should continue planning urban facilities—which might actually require shifting responsibilities from BPR—but details, especially transit-related, were ambiguous. Indeed, when on March 2 the president unveiled plans for the new department, he said simply that DOT and HUD would cooperate for “wide-scale, rational planning,” expressing a “coherent” voice. HUD would provide a “unified Federal approach to urban problems.” DOT would contribute, but according to Boyd, “it would have created some political embarrassment” had transit been transferred so soon after HUD’s formation.
DOT’s rollout went more smoothly than the four-year struggle to evolve Kennedy’s urban affairs concept into a HUD that passed Congressional muster. Legislation to create DOT received lopsided majorities in both houses the same year as proposed, partly because of Johnson’s commanding post-election mandate, partly because road funds benefited every state.96 Another reason was that certain hard decisions—such as where to position the administration of transit programs and who would supervise regional planning—were put off. Lawmakers made little mention of previous excitement about a strong HUD role over highway planning. Congress members also failed to propose alternatives, such as making transportation programs units of an expanded HUD.

Some were adamant that aspects of BPR’s approach, such as its resistance to multimodalism, go unchallenged. American Association of State Highway Officials president Charles Shumate testified to the Senate, “we firmly believe the proper role for highways in any so-called balanced national transportation system or program must honor public opinion . . . we would oppose highway resources being diverted.”97 He was not against handling transportation policy under one roof—assuming highway planning and the federal-state relationship went untouched. This raised questions about the utility of moving transit in a future DOT. HUD staff, meanwhile, were convinced that transit should remain there, but played it cool during DOT hearings. Charles M. Haar, head of HUD’s Office of Metropolitan Development and former Harvard Law professor, argued that more study was needed. Several members of Congress disagreed; Ribicoff, for example, was unsure of what justification there was for not including transit in DOT.98

As a compromise, the law creating DOT included a provision that the two departments study the issue—thereby preventing a transfer for the time being. HUD’s Dwight Ink, assistant secretary for administration, negotiated this deal.99 Although at the bill signing in October 1966, Johnson said DOT would engage highways, transit, and planning,100 the law’s Section 4(g) required agreement from HUD and DOT on transit.101 The study began in earnest when DOT opened its doors on April 1, 1967.102

Even after DOT’s Creation, HUD Engages in Transportation Planning, Prioritizing Inner Cities

HUD insisted that it retain oversight of transit even as DOT was established. Agency leaders felt they had succeeded in investing in low-income, urban neighborhoods over the five preceding years. Lawmakers implied they accepted the agency’s role; in 1966 legislation appropriating funds to UMTA, Congress strengthened HUD’s power over transit by adding support for planning new transit routes.103 White House staff such as Califano wanted the agency to evaluate how it could improve travel for families in segregated, isolated inner-city “ghettos.”104 HUD staff, too, wanted to focus on transportation projects that expanded the mobility of the poor and created a more livable urban environment. For Haar,

HUD does not regard a transportation system as something that can be superimposed on a city . . . transit systems have to serve a real purpose in making the city a more meaningful and productive place for the individuals who live and work in it and those who visit it . . . we cannot . . . deprive large segments of our urban population of the means of seeking and holding a job, or of securing adequate medical attention, or of ready access to cultural and recreational centers.105

Haar’s office invested in connecting central-city residents and jobs. In this way, he “relat[ed] transportation to the physical development of the entire Metropolitan area.” This was a particular concern in the context of the urban uprisings of 1965 and 1967, which hinted that (federally supported) urban development was failing minority communities. HUD developed a demonstration project improving bus service in Los Angeles’s Watts neighborhood, a site of significant protest. Expanded ridership indicated to HUD leaders that analogous investments across the country
were necessary. Similarly, HUD used its Demonstration Cities program to integrate transit into local infrastructure and social services. It also engaged in experimentation in increased transit service in Boston, transit to new development areas in Memphis, and automated services in Pittsburgh, among other initiatives.

HUD successfully associated transit investments with comprehensive regional planning in some cases. In 1967, for example, Chicago officials asked HUD to fund transit projects on two expressway corridors. Weaver, however, denied the application until the plan incorporated Indiana. For Weaver, HUD could help cities develop “workable and meaningful plans” that leveraged transit investments for metropolitan planning and aided in the creation of new inter-governmental organizations. “HUD has not simply acknowledged the Mass Transportation function in urban development,” he wrote to Califano. “It has given high priority to its effective and vigorous administration.”

Within HUD, however, there was an acknowledgment that the agency did not have adequate means related to transportation. Haar and others at HUD suggested that the problems of the central-city poor needed to be addressed through increased transit spending. This, in turn, raised the possibility of fewer highway expenditures—an important federal program for much of the country—if they competed for the same money. In short, HUD’s work was verging into politically treacherous territory.

**Administering Transit as Transportation: DOT Takes Over**

HUD had taken on the management of public transportation programs, progressively integrating them with land-use and regional planning policy. Yet, in 1968, White House leaders agreed to move transit programs to DOT. In this section, I argue that this shift was triggered by a two-pronged transformation. On one hand, HUD suffered from the sometimes racist perception that it was too focused on housing the urban poor—particularly minority populations—and thus was the inappropriate steward of transportation policy. On the other hand, HUD’s loss of transit oversight was not a clear-cut defeat for an outlook that prioritized regional planning, because DOT leaders, too, began emphasizing that they wanted to connect transit and urbanism. Instead, DOT management highlighted a newfound embrace of multimodal mobility, though without much interest in social justice, shaking off critiques of the roads-only BPR and clearing the way to integrate transit programs with the highway system.

**Challenges to HUD and Momentum at DOT**

HUD’s attention to central-city residents, both in projects prioritized and its interest in improving metropolitan coordination, was controversial, opening an opportunity for DOT. HUD reaffirmed some critics’ views, exposed in the debates over the department’s formation, that the agency was too focused on a deprived portion of the population, rather than the supposed widespread interests advanced by DOT’s highways. This criticism came from varying angles. Rural-state Congress members, for one, were skeptical of an agency designed for others. Others, meanwhile, worried that HUD’s use of transit as a crucial component of the War on Poverty had inappropriately shifted transit from its purpose, which Bronx representative Jonathan Bingham wrote extended “beyond the ghetto.” He worried that HUD’s actions risked the agency losing support. For the public, urban uprisings and mounting challenges for urban renewal and public housing programs encouraged the view of failed agency management.

When HUD’s policy mission came under attack, it lacked the organizational coherence or institutional allies to mount an effective defense. In the executive branch, communication between Weaver and the other secretaries was weak. Boyd remembered, “we were at Cabinet meetings, and
Weaver was having some problems, and [Johnson said,] ‘I want every one of you fellows to help him’ . . . we’d all say, ‘yes sir, Mr. President’ and know damn well we were lying.”113

If the goal was to harmonize urban programs, according to Case, HUD lacked “authority commensurate with the responsibilities that properly belong to it”; some actively sought to undermine it.114 One Congressperson tried to remove planning from HUD’s oversight altogether. Other agencies expressed interest in assuming its jurisdiction over water infrastructure.115 Internally, HUD suffered from disagreement about its mission. Bureau of the Budget officials told Califano that the agency’s mobilization of transit programs “as an inducement for multijurisdictional planning” had only occurred occasionally.116 Most urban areas, even those with transit grants, remained fragmented. A presidential task force report diagnosed the agency with a series of illnesses, offering a possible treatment:

[HUD] is still searching for its identity. . . [it has] timidity and insecurity . . . [and] rumored lack of confidence in the White House . . . [It] requires a strategic Presidential decision.117

Unfortunately for HUD, presidential leadership in its favor was missing, and the brand-new DOT was building momentum, buoyed by support from states appreciative of grants from BPR, now transformed into the Federal Highway Administration.118 Encouraged by the federal government, states were creating their own DOTs, multimodal analogues of an expanded U.S. DOT.119 And even as HUD oversaw comprehensive land-use plans of its own, DOT could rely on networks of MPOs that local governments began to establish following the 1962 Federal-Aid Highway Act, and which were developing long-term metropolitan plans.120 Its parallel set of institutions challenged HUD’s planning work, which, unlike DOT’s, was not linked to infrastructure funding apart from modest transit grants.

Under secretary Boyd’s leadership, DOT invested in new technology beyond highways, within and between metropolitan regions. For Boyd, “federal resource allocation to transportation development needs should proceed on an integrated basis which permits meaningful trade-offs between all alternatives that take account of advantages of each mode.”121 Inspired by Japan’s trains, for instance, DOT planned rail improvements between Boston and Washington.122 This project, incorporating stations and surrounding construction, undermined HUD’s argument that it could differentiate intercity transport (supposedly in DOT’s wheelhouse) and intracity transport (HUD’s). DOT was showing how it, too, could connect transit with metropolitan plans. Still, HUD’s interest in social justice—prioritizing linking mobility with poor communities, public housing investment, and the like—was lacking at DOT.

Boyd’s original hope was to have an assistant secretary for Urban Affairs embedded at DOT, but he later remembered that “we decided we couldn’t afford to do that because it would be presumptuous” before transit functions were transferred. Still, the line between DOT’s supervision of highways and aviation, and HUD’s supervision of transit, became blurred. DOT, for example, conducted studies related to downtown parking and transit to Dulles Airport on Washington’s outskirts.123 Since DOT had “interest in metropolitan affairs,” according to Boyd, his agency should plan transit to airports.124 And DOT’s national transportation plan was on the horizon; this would integrate all transportation modes, at multiple scales.125 What role would HUD play in this process if DOT pursued this investigation?

Both HUD and DOT, then, were intervening actively in urban transportation, and both had a rationale for doing so by 1967. Even White House aide Califano seemed baffled about which agency was supposed to do what; he occasionally sent both Boyd and Weaver the same instructions about new policies to consider.126 Congress, too, lacked a clear sense of agency purpose, and some members worried about program duplication. They questioned how they could appropriate funds when both departments had jurisdiction over metropolitan transportation and planning.127
The Conflict over Funding Transit Comes to a Head in 1968

The 1966 legislation creating DOT, as noted, included a requirement that it work with HUD to determine the administrative shape of federal transit policy. The agencies, however, did not enter the discussion on an even footing. HUD was smarting from its programmatic difficulties and an already-compromised position in Congress. DOT, however, enjoyed approval from all quarters. Moreover, previous criticisms about Commerce’s roads fixation did not apply to Johnson’s DOT.

Even so, officials at HUD hoped to gain the upper hand. In the run-up to the DOT legislation, HUD staff exchanged memos about expanding 701 planning funds to incorporate regional planning dollars and personnel then appropriated to BPR under the Highway Act.128 Once DOT was approved, Haar tried to convince Weaver that HUD should go on the offense. HUD should seize control of a broad suite of transportation programs the new DOT was supposed to manage:

We cannot allow our cities to be paved over with highway concrete . . . we cannot encourage sound land uses and democratic social development in cities which are equipped with alien transportation hardware.129

Wood emphasized to Weaver that the agency needed to “assure the close and continuing relationship of mass transportation activities within the pattern of land use . . . especially at the planning stage.” An internal HUD document noted that HUD was the right location for transit and that the department needed the program to enforce its other goals: “Divorced from grants, planning becomes sterile and academic. Divorced from planning, grant processing becomes unimaginative, routinized.” Haar argued that a transfer of transit to DOT “would be seriously injurious to HUD, our cities, and the national welfare.” The solution was for DOT to transfer its urban highway aid to HUD.130

Staff from both agencies began meeting in April 1967 to discuss jurisdiction.131 Simultaneously, however, Boyd traversed the nation promoting DOT—and his interest in taking on transit. Haar was frustrated, noting that Boyd “has a facility for leaving his audience with the impression that urban mass transportation is his domain.” Speaking to the Florida legislature, Boyd even spoke as if the appropriate distribution of powers would involve granting DOT power over land-use planning.132 In so doing, Boyd was also reinforcing the potential for multimodal state oversight of transportation, itself a disruption of the traditional highway-only state focus.133 That summer, Boyd instructed staff to articulate the necessity of DOT oversight of transit, while staving off other potential losses. Robert Shapiro, an agency lawyer, made a legal case against moving urban highways to HUD, noting “that portion of the program can’t be severed without risking unsafe and uneconomical inconsistencies” with the rest of the road network.134

The disagreement between the agencies made it impossible for either to agree to an institutional reorganization plan. In late August, Califano wrote to the agency heads, asking them to terminate the study by October 1 so as to ensure that recommendations could be incorporated into the upcoming budget.135 At the end of September, at a summit of HUD and DOT leaders, Boyd offered HUD control over the location of transportation corridors within urban areas. Boyd had likely been influenced by his staff’s sense that a quid pro quo was necessary to ensure cities did not contest a transfer of transit programs in the context of a perception of decades of neglect and, according to one official, “the contest between the cities and the States over direct access to Federal funds.” But DOT’s offer was inadequate for Weaver and Haar, who argued that planning required the “means of the grease for the machinery which was provided by the mass transit grants.”136 The two secretaries thus gave up; each wrote letters to Califano describing their position, both hoping to end up with control over transit. For Weaver,
Mass transportation is a leading factor shaping the orderly and sound growth of cities and suburbs. [HUD] must have the muscle of a grant program to integrate local urban mass transportation into local urban systems. Planning without program authority implies an advisory and consultative role. It is extremely risky to try to tame the highway program by associating the administration of mass transit with that of roads. These groups are also highly dubious of the possibilities of diverting highway trust funds to mass transportation.137

Weaver emphasized that a move to DOT could endanger transit programs, since he claimed DOT had the mentality of highway-building BPR. But Boyd argued that DOT understood the connection between land use and transportation. And he questioned HUD’s monopoly over urban issues:

We regard all transportation as a function which should serve, not govern, the social, economic and other environmental goals. Congress has already imposed an obligation on DOT to approve only those projects which conform to regional and local urban plans. To argue for the continuation of urban mass transit in HUD because it affects urban life seems to argue for the inclusion of all transportation programs and logically leads to the conclusion that all Federal programs affecting urban life should be administered by HUD.138

Califano asked his staff to resolve the disagreement; fatally for HUD, he instructed them to give “no consideration... to the transfer of any DOT programs to HUD.” This limitation conditioned the conversation. One early memo pragmatically argued that DOT’s larger footprint on transportation, including in cities through highways, would allow it to “pave HUD over” (if HUD kept transit); moving transit to DOT, however, would make the latter agency “responsive and responsible.”139

HUD’s perspective was that transit programs gave it the power to influence metropolitan planning and gave transit leverage against a highway-dominated DOT. Some within the Bureau of the Budget agreed with these views. Staff from one Bureau division noted to Schultze that “HUD is more likely to be sensitive to the impact of urban transportation systems on human values and the quality of the urban environment,” and that transit should be oriented “more livable cities rather than... a more efficient national transportation system.” Fred Bohen, who worked under Califano, emphasized that HUD’s efforts to encourage regional planning through the 701 program required leveraging transit grants, and he hoped to use 701 as the nation’s tool to guarantee sound land use. Bohen argued sarcastically that, without supervision of transit, it might not make sense for HUD to be involved in “urban development” at all; perhaps such programs should move to DOT instead.140

Nevertheless, most White House staff endorsed the reorganization, at HUD’s expense. At the base of much of the support for DOT oversight was the sense that the agency would not pursue its earlier roads-only approach; Schultze later reflected that “one of the best things that could ever happen to the [DOT] is to give the secretary a counterweight to the traditional [BPR] approach to life.” The administration agreed that highway construction had hurt communities. But in Boyd, White House staff saw “existing proper climate in the Secretary’s office in DOT— that is, a perspective of the service nature of transportation and its role in community development.” Matt Nimetz, on Califano’s staff, was hopeful that by moving transit to DOT, the agency would think “creatively about transportation problems all through their system.” Hoping HUD could “exert outside influence” was futile.141

By November 1967, Bureau of the Budget memos reflected internal agreement that transit should be moved. HUD’s power over DOT decisions should be limited because this would result in a “blurring [of] overall authority.”142 (Although the blurring of authority over regional planning raised few concerns.) Only specific matters that explicitly implicated both land use and
transportation—Schultze mentioned the then-fashionable idea of linear cities—should engage both agencies directly.\textsuperscript{143} Deputy Bureau director Charles Zwick noted that “the effectiveness of this approach to urban transportation planning will of course depend on how both Secretaries involve the two agencies.”\textsuperscript{144} Califano and Schultze agreed that transit should be transferred to DOT. A related report to the president maintained that if HUD’s role in “guiding comprehensive planning, including comprehensive transportation planning,” were expanded, the transfer would be effective. The president signed off on the reorganization.\textsuperscript{145}

During January 1968, Boyd and Weaver contacted Congress members about the issue. Several members of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, which supervised HUD and thus transit programs, worried about losing jurisdiction over urban transportation.\textsuperscript{146} But their opposition was in the minority. Despite his previously strong position about keeping transit out of Commerce, Williams now accepted the idea of the transfer. The American Transit Association, National Association of County Organizations, Association of American Railroads, American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), and similar groups were on board.\textsuperscript{147}

The situation set the stage for an undermining of efforts to integrate transit with housing and land use. On one hand, HUD’s position was that its “consulting” role meant it should be able to ensure that urban transportation abided by comprehensive plans developed through the 701 program. Even if HUD no longer supervised transit, its leaders held, it still retained “primacy with respect to overall urban development and urban planning.”\textsuperscript{148} DOT, on the other hand, attempted to zero HUD out, asking the agency to limit its involvement to giving advice. Boyd noted that while he had “good relations” with Weaver, “our two departments didn’t get along very well”; they resisted the secretary’s efforts to give HUD more planning authority. DOT staff wanted to expand their own regional planning function.\textsuperscript{149} Alan Dean, DOT assistant secretary, noted that a split over authority “will engender confusion and uncertainty.” Ultimately, DOT’s position proved more persuasive at the White House, which grew convinced that all transportation matters should be handled by the same agency: no requirement for HUD involvement would be invoked in the reorganization.\textsuperscript{150} From an administrative perspective, this meant no agency would supervise all aspects of the urban experience.

The Decision Is Made

In late February 1968, the president unveiled the reorganization proposal. HUD would be “responsible for the character of all urban development” and would “provide leadership in comprehensive planning at the local level that includes transportation planning.” DOT was “concerned specifically with all the modes of transportation and their efficient inter-relationship.”\textsuperscript{151} This confirmed the failure to fully integrate land use, housing, and transportation policies—even if DOT did concern itself with some regional planning.

According to White House staff, the reorganization served two purposes. First, state and local governments would work with just one intermediary on transportation (the “single agency concept”). Second, transportation funding would be allocated more efficiently—meaning multiple modes could be evaluated simultaneously. Yet, there was still some confusion. DOT interpreted this mandate as meaning that it would oversee all transportation decisions. HUD, meanwhile, held that for projects such as a subway, community members and businesses would be impacted, thus it would intervene. Only HUD understood the “interests and welfare of the general public,” according to agency staff.\textsuperscript{152}

The institutional change—Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1968—authorized a July 1 transfer.\textsuperscript{153} Critics in Congress were subdued. Certain House members were concerned that the reorganization gave HUD too much control over planning by acknowledging its primacy there. DOT officials responded that, “the Secretary of Transportation would not be bound by the recommendations
of HUD.” However, Senator Javits worried about HUD’s loss of authority. He reaffirmed that cooperation would “depend upon informal relationships and the capacity of the two Secretaries to work together at any given time.” Would that always be the case?

In response to Javits, Boyd and Weaver noted that HUD would continue “assisting and guiding area-wide comprehensive planning.” “If urban transportation systems do not fit into the comprehensively planned development of the area,” they wrote, “the mere fact that the transportation services themselves are integrated and multi-modal may be of little utility.” But, again, DOT supervised its own regional planning program and clearly saw it as adequate. In the fall, White House staff finalized responsibilities—largely by giving DOT increased control over urban transportation.

From a multimodal, regional planning perspective, this approach held some promise; after all, DOT was reforming away from a roads focus. The 1968 Highway Act ensured that people displaced by highways would get moving assistance, and planners would have to consider social and environmental impacts in picking alignments. Within DOT, Boyd established the Urban Transportation Coordination Group to tackle needs specific to cities. Many concerns about how BPR acted were being addressed.

Simultaneously, HUD reorganized itself. An optimist, Haar created an Office of Urban Transportation Development within HUD to coordinate with DOT, but it was inadequately staffed. Moreover, while Haar wanted to continue work on issues such as transit in low-income neighborhoods, he received little support from above. Responding to one of Haar’s proposals, Weaver told him, “we are out of this type of transportation, except to complete our ongoing projects.”

There were other indications that HUD transportation efforts would be undermined. At a DOT party in September, a “joke” news bulletin was read to the audience. Paul Sitton, soon-to-be UMTA administrator, “said he, personally, believed there were a number of functions—auxiliary to urban transportation—remaining” at HUD, the bulletin noted. “Our first step will be to begin a staff study of whether there is any longer a need for HUD now that its most important work is being done by another agency,” Sitton supposedly said. It was a gag, but it reflected a real perception within DOT. Having received a copy, Haar asked Weaver and Wood, “where do jokes stop?”

**Conclusion: Harmful Consequences of an Administrative Reorganization?**

Faced with white flight, urban disinvestment, pollution, sprawl, and congestion, Washington officials identified transit as a key priority. While they could have chosen to locate such programs within Commerce, from which highway funds were then appropriated, they looked instead to HHFA. This choice was informed by a distrust of BPR to design projects that improved urban quality of life, a distrust cultivated by the agency’s willingness to fund highways that demolished huge sections of inner cities, and the resulting public uproar. Moreover, officials excited about encouraging regional planning and interested in creating a department dedicated to urban affairs saw HHFA as the right landing spot. The creation of a transit program thus reflected changing views in the U.S. government about what types of transportation should be funded, and a budding interest in integrating land-use and transport planning.

Why, then, did the Johnson administration move transit programs to DOT in 1968? First, HUD’s rollout responded inadequately to growing urban problems, and support for HUD management was narrow even at the White House. The choice to separate transportation planning from HUD’s larger housing and urban renewal programs reinforced the disconnect between the agency’s primary endeavors and urban mobility. Second, while HUD’s efforts to engage in transport planning went unappreciated—and were subject to criticism as being too focused on the
urban poor—DOT leaders shook off the anti-city approaches of BPR and promoted a vision founded on a positive view for multimodal, inclusive planning that incorporated respect for existing urban neighborhoods. In other words, to expand its mission, DOT was responsive to critique, though it steered clear of HUD’s social justice priorities.

These arrangements, however, set transit up for a precarious future. There has been inadequate research thus far to assess whether the failure to integrate public transportation into HUD programs reduced the agency’s credibility over urban development because it forfeited this program. Still, the 1960s left a legacy of odd arrangements, such as the fact that long-term regional plans developed by MPOs—which now often incorporate land-use elements such as areas for growth and protection—are submitted for evaluation not to HUD (which has little infrastructure funding to condition on such plans), but rather to DOT. The result has been a bifurcation of authority over urban affairs and ineffective federal oversight of metropolitan planning, which often remains, de facto, in the hands of state DOTs.

For transit to play an important role in U.S. cities, it would need consistent interest in multimodal approaches from DOT—plus support from the White House and Congress. The federal government did shift its expenditures between 1960 and 1980, moving from massive spending on highways to devoting almost as much to transit. But interest declined thereafter. Per capita federal expenditures on transit during the 1990s and 2000s were half those in 1980, whereas highway spending plateaued. Positioning transit within DOT may have encouraged increased transit funding in the 1970s, but it also paved the way for the following decline; it did not “tame” the highway program. Moreover, 1960s goals—such as reining in sprawl and reducing car dependence through “orderly and sound growth”—have not been achieved. Efforts to increase multimodal transportation planning, such as through MPOs, have not broken the power of state governments, whose own DOTs invest in little beyond highways. Despite the federal DOT’s claim that it would manage transportation within regional planning, “as a function which should serve, not govern, the social, economic and other environmental goals,” the links between transit, housing, and land use never panned out.

Interviewed in retrospect, Boyd argued that the transfer “was probably the wrong decision . . . I think [transit] is so crucial to housing . . . I think it would have been more successful” at HUD. DOT has yet to realize a close relationship with HUD to encourage better links between the transit program and the housing and community facilities HUD funds.

Abbreviations
BPR: Bureau of Public Roads; DOT: Department of Transportation; FTA: Federal Transit Administration; HHFA: Housing and Home Finance Agency; HUD: Department of Housing and Urban Development; UMTA: Urban Mass Transportation Administration; ‡: Box; §: Folder; ©: Series; ASB: Personal Papers of Alan S. Boyd, Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library; CPC: Clifford P. Case Papers, Rutgers University Library; HAW: Harrison A. Williams Papers, Rutgers University Library; JCG: Office files of James C. Gaither, Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library; JFK: John F. Kennedy Presidential Library; LBJ: Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library; REM: Records of Robert E. Merriam, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library (this material shared with me by Jeff Davis); WHCSF/WHCF: White House Central Subject Files (JFK)/White House Central Files (LBJ); USD: Record Group 398 (Department of Transportation), U.S. National Archives College Park; Series General Subject Files of the Deputy Undersecretary and Undersecretary, 1967-1972; Box 14; Folder Urban Mass Transportation Functions (this material shared with me by Jeff Davis).

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Notes
6. I also explored some third-party sources to fill gaps, such as Jeff Davis, “What’s the Purpose of Mass Transit,” Eno Transportation Weekly, June 25, 2018, https://www.enotrans.org/article/whats-the-purpose-of-mass-transit-part-1/.


19. For the Eisenhower administration’s perspective, see U.S. Department of Commerce, *Federal Transportation Policy and Program*, March 1960. Letter from Clifford P. Case to Mr. Elmer L. Mundy, March 8, 1960, § Railroads, ‡ 256, CPC. Minutes of the Third Meeting of the *Ad Hoc* Interagency Committee on Metropolitan Area Problems, June 16, 1960, 2, § Ad Hoc Interagency Committee on Metropolitan Problems (1), ‡ 1, REM.

20. Letter from Clifford P. Case to Mr. James E. Knauff, September 22, 1960, § Commuters, ‡ 250, CPC.


22. Report to the President on Urban Transportation Organization. HUD and DOT, February 19, 1968, § IS 3-1 Transfer of HUD to DOT, ‡ 19, RCW.


24. White House staff admitted that jurisdictional battles between municipalities made the prospect of such coordination difficult to envision. Address by the Honorable Robert E. Merriam, Deputy Assistant to the President, November 29, 1960, § Eighty-Seventh Cong.: First Sess., CPS, S.608, URBAN REDEVELOPMENT, H&HFA assistance in highways, etc., ‡ 172, CPC. Memo from Robert Merriam to David Bell and Frederick Dutton, January 17, 1961, § Ad Hoc Interagency Committee on Metropolitan Problems (1), ‡ 1, REM.

25. Memorandum on S.345, Mass Transportation [no date]; Letter from Dwight R. G. Palmer, Commissioner, to Harrison A. Williams Jr. February 24, 1961, both in § S.345, 87-1, Urban Mass Transportation Act, ‡ 707, HAW.


27. Letter from Harrison A. Williams Jr., to Dwight R. G. Palmer, March 2, 1961, § S.345, 87-1, Urban Mass Transportation Act, ‡ 707, HAW.

28. A note to the organizational representatives who cooperate in the housing legislation information services and to NHC’s friends in the field, from Nathaniel S. Keith, President, National Housing Conference, April 12, 1961, § S.345, 87-1, Urban Mass Transportation Act, ‡ 707, HAW.


31. Letter from Sidney Spector to Frederick G. Dutton, June 15, 1961, enclosing “a statement on the need for such a Department, prepared by our program and research group.” © 14, FG, ‡ 0212, § FG 999-1 Department of Housing and Urban Affairs, January 20, 1961-January 10, 1962 EXECUTIVE, WHCSF, JFK.


35. Letter from Robert C. Wood to Harrison A. Williams Jr., February 1, 1961; Letter from Harrison A. Williams Jr. to Editor, the Daily Journal [Elizabeth], February 22, 1961; Letter from William E. Oriol, Press Assistant to Senator Harrison A. Williams Jr., to Mr. Joseph Sage, Editorial Board, Sun, February 9, 1961; Letter from Harrison A. Williams Jr. to Editor, Newark Evening News, February 16, 1961, all in § Metro Affairs: Open Space (1 of 9), ‡ 447, HAW.

36. Williams was concerned about Republicans getting credit for adding transit programs to an omnibus bill later on. Remarks of Senator Williams on Senate Floor, January 11, 1961 [notes version]; and Letter from Harrison A. Williams Jr. to Mr. Lee C. White, The White House, April 28, 1961, both in § S.345, 87-1, Urban Mass Transportation Act, ‡ 707, HAW.


38. The question of what “area-wide” comprehensive planning meant was a matter of debate. As used by legislators, “area-wide” meant metropolitan, meaning relevant to more than one municipality. Stanley Tankel of Regional Plan Association questioned whether there would ever be a clear definition of the region with regard to “comprehensive planning”; he suggested concentrating transportation in one agency because identifying what was local and what was not was impossible. Letter from John F. Kennedy to Speaker Sam Rayburn, June 19, 1961, © 30, LE, ‡ 0496, § LE/TN2, WHCSF, JFK; Text of Senator Case’s five-minute broadcast on the status of legislation he has sponsored for better coordination of the metropolitan area development plans of the federal, state, county, municipal and regional governments, April 23, 1963, § S. 561, Eighty-Ninth Cong.: First Sess., Federal Grants-in-Aid (Intergovernmental Relations), ‡ 176, CPC; Letter from Stanley Tankel, Planning Director, Regional Plan Association, to Robert C. Wood, then Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), January 21, 1965, § FG 170 April 7, 1966-September 16, 1966, ‡ 253, FG, WHCF, LBJ.


44. Letter from Lee C. White to E. M. Khoury [an engineer], May 9, 1962. © 57, TN, § 0966, § TN 2 MASS TRANSPORTATION November 1, 1961-May 31, 1962, WHCSF, JFK.

45. The law passed despite state associations having campaigned against such mandates; note also that the use of metropolitan planning organizations (MPOs) was not specifically required until later. The dominance of state DOTs over MPOs remains a characteristic of U.S. metropolitan planning policy. The highway planning program was referred to as the 1 and 1/2% program. See Mohl, “The Interstates and the Cities”; Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1962, September 5, 1962, Mr. Chavez, from the Committee on Public Works, submitted the following Report to accompany H.R. 12135, § Highway Act of 1962, § 706, HAW; Memo from Boyd to Harold Seidman, Assistant Director for Management and Organization, Bureau of the Budget, March 14, 1967, § Reports: Program Priorities—Mass Transportation, March 1967-December 1968, § 61, ASB; Policy Statement of the American Association of State Highway Officials, as developed by the Chief Administrative Officers of the State Highway Departments, Meeting in Detroit, Michigan, November 27, 1960, § Eighty-Seventh Cong.: First Sess., CPS, S.608, URBAN REDEVELOPMENT, H&HFA assistance in highways, etc., ‡ 172, CPC; Memo from Gordon Murray to DOT staff, December 21, 1967, USD.

46. Policy Statement of the American Association of State Highway Officials, as developed by the Chief Administrative Officers of the State Highway Departments, Meeting in Detroit, Michigan, November 27, 1960, § Eighty-Seventh Cong.: First Sess., CPS, S.608, URBAN REDEVELOPMENT, H&HFA assistance in highways, etc., ‡ 172, CPC.

47. Letter from Clifford P. Case to Robert C. Weaver, December 29, 1961; Letter from Robert C. Weaver to Clifford P. Case, January 19, 1962, both in § Eighty-Seventh Cong.: First Sess., CPS, S.608, URBAN REDEVELOPMENT, H&HFA assistance in highways, etc., ‡ 172, CPC.

48. Letter from Harrison A. Williams Jr. to Mr. Raymond E. Hirst, August 24, 1962, § Metro Affairs: Mass Transport (15 of 31), § 447, HAW.

49. The future department’s name continued to fluctuate over time. In letters, the president referred to it as the department of Urban Affairs and Housing. Letter from Gordon T. Nesvig, Clerk of the Board of Supervisors, Los Angeles County, from Lee C. White, Assistant Special Counsel to the President, February 14, 1962; Memo: “Salinger Statement” [Pierre Salinger, The White House], January 23, 1962, both in © 14, FG, § 0212, § FG 999-1 January 11, 1962-February 15, 1962 EXECUTIVE, WHCSF, JFK.


51. Letter from Harrison A. Williams Jr. to Rolado J. Delfausse, Executive Director, Greater Elizabeth Movement, August 8, 1962, § Metro Affairs: Mass Transport (14 of 31), § 447, HAW.


54. In the long term, Lausche’s nationalization concerns were proven right, for better or worse! Letter from Harrison A. Williams Jr. to Mr. Lester A. Crone, President, Unit Truck Corporation, September 20, 1962, § Metro Affairs: Mass Transport (15 of 31), § 447, HAW.


56. Letter from Harrison A. Williams Jr. to Mr. Thomas T. Taber, Chairman, the Board of Public Transportation of Morris County, March 6, 1963, § Metro Affairs: Mass Transport (24 of 31), § 447, HAW.


62. The amendment to reduce the bill’s size was opposed by Case, Massachusetts’ Ted Kennedy, the Connecticut senators, and several others; Williams voted for the change. Senate Democrats who opposed the final bill were largely Southern and rural, such as Indiana’s Birch Bayh, Maine’s Edmund Muskie, the senators from Mississippi, North Carolina, Virginia, and both Lausche and Proxmire. Senate Bill S.6 Symington Amend. To reduce the Grant Authorization from $500 million to a three-year total of $375 million, April 4, 1963, GovTrack, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/88-1963/s15; Senate Bill S.6 Passage, April 4, 1963, GovTrack, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/88-1963/s21; Senate Bill S.6 Passage, June 30, 1964, GovTrack, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/88-1964/s427; Federal Transit Administration, “A Brief History of Mass Transit,” https://www.transit.dot.gov/about/brief-history-mass-transit; Letter from Harrison A. Williams Jr. to Mr. Eugene Browne, April 12, 1963, § Metro Affairs: Mass Transport (17 of 31), § 447, HAW.


64. Letter from Harrison A. Williams Jr. to John O. Pastore, U.S. Senate, September 25, 1964, § Metro Affairs: Mass Transport (29 of 31), § 447, HAW.

66. Letter from Sidney Spector to Frederick G. Dutton, June 15, 1961, enclosing “a statement on the need for such a Department, prepared by our program and research group”: 4-5. © 14, FG, ‡ 0212, § FG 999-1 Dept of Housing and Urban Affairs January 20, 1961-January 10, 1962 EXECUTIVE, WHCSF, JFK.

67. Telegram from Robert Wagner, Mayor of New York, to John F. Kennedy, April 13, 1961. © 30, LE, ‡ 0495, § LE/TN 1/20/61-12/31/62, WHCSF, JFK.

68. Letter from Clifford P. Case to Robert C. Weaver, December 29, 1961, § Eighty-Seventh Cong.: First Sess., CPS, S.608, URBAN REDEVELOPMENT, H&HFA assistance in highways, etc., ‡ 172, CPC; Text of Senator Case’s five-minute broadcast, February 26, 1963, § S. 561, Eighty-Ninth Cong.: First Sess., Federal Grants-in-Aid (Intergovernmental Relations), ‡ 176, CPC.

69. Letter from Harrison A. Williams Jr., to Dwight R. G. Palmer, March 2, 1961, § S.345-87-1—Urban Mass Transportation Act, ‡ 707, HAW.

70. Memorandum from Harrison A. Williams Jr. to John F. Kennedy, Re: Mass Transportation Jurisdictional Conflict, April 5, 1961. © 30, LE, ‡ 0495, § LE/TN 1/20/61-12/31/62, WHCSF, JFK. See also Rose and Seely, “Getting the Interstate System Built.”


74. On August 12, 2020, President Donald Trump, perhaps inspired by similar motivations, tweeted, “The ‘suburban housewife’ will be voting for me. They want safety & are thrilled that I ended the long running program where low income housing would invade their neighborhood. Biden would reinstall it, in a bigger form, with Corey [sic] Booker in charge [of HUD]!” During the confusion about Weaver’s future in summer 1962, he took a leave at the Ford Foundation. See multiple items. ‡ 0213, WHCSF, JFK; Memorandum to the President from Larry O’Brien, April 27, 1962. © 21 Housing, HO, ‡ 0356, § HS HOUSING, WHCSF, JFK. See also Interview with Robert C. Weaver, Interviewer Joe B. Frantz, November 19, 1968, Oral Histories, LBJ.

75. Letter from John F. Kennedy to Lyndon Johnson, March 5, 1963. © 30, LE, ‡ 0495, § LE/TN January 1, 1963-, WHCSF, JFK.

76. The Federal Housing Administration (FHA) played an important role in the conversation about the formation of HUD in later years, as well, because of the popularity of its loans. Letter from Lee C. White to Linda M. Braudy, a University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) Student, May 12, 1964, § FG 170 Department of Housing and Urban Development November 23, 1963-December 8, 1964, ‡ 254, FG, WHCF, LBJ; Letter from Charles L. Schultz to William L. Dawson, Chairman, Committee on Government Operations, House, June 14, 1965, § FG 170 HUD December 9, 1964-September 15, 1965, ‡ 255, FG, WHCF, LBJ.


80. Despite winning approval of his new department, Johnson nevertheless delayed appointing Weaver. Concerns about appointing a Black official to such a high post festered, and Johnson could not make
up his mind—he evaluated several other candidates for the position in late 1965. Letter from Robert C. Weaver to the Honorable A. Willis Robertson, Chairman, Committee on Banking and Currency, December 13, 1965, § 5. 1532, Eighty-Ninth Cong.: First Sess., Urban Planning, § 176, CPC.


82. Task force recommendations: Proposed Programs for HUD, December 1965; Memo from Harry C. McPherson Jr. to the President, December 23, 1965, both in § FG 170 Department of Housing and Urban Development (1964-1966) [1 of 2], ¶ 31, Confidential File FG 165-7, LBJ.


85. Weaver wanted to “scramble it up” to prevent autonomy of division. Interview with Robert C. Weaver, Interviewer Joe B. Frantz, November 19, 1968, 41, Oral Histories, LBJ; Memo from Robert C. Weaver, Administrator, to Harry C. McPherson Jr., Special Assistant to the President, November 13, 1965, § FG 170 HUD October 30, 1965-November 20, 1965, ¶ 252, FG, WHCF, LBJ.


87. Memo from Robert C. Weaver to All HUD Employees, February 24, 1966; Memo from Charles L. Schlutze, Director of the Bureau of the Budget, to Joe Califano, November 5, 1965, both in § FG 170 01/26/66-02/24/66, ¶ 252, FG, WHCF, LBJ.


89. Statement from the Office of Clifford P. Case, April 29, 1963, § S.1122, Eighty-Ninth Cong.: First Sess., DOT, ¶ 176, CPC.

90. Memo to the President from The Secretary of Commerce, August 18, 1965, § FG 170 HUD November 23, 1963-October 29, 1965, ¶ 252, FG, WHCF, LBJ.


96. There was some conflict about integrating autonomous agencies, such as the Maritime Administration and the Aviation Administration. The department passed the Senate 64-2 and the House 336-42. To pass H.R.15963, the Department of Transportation Act, August 30, 1966, GovTrack, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/89-1966/h318; To pass H.R.15963, A bill to establish the Department of Transportation, September 29, 1966, GovTrack, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/89-1966/s462.
97. Statement of Charles E. Shumate, President of the American Association of State Highway Officials, Before the Senate Committee on Government Operations, March 30, 1966, § IS 3-2 Transportation, ¶ 20, RCW.

98. Oddly, despite the Federal Railroad Administration being created as a subagency in the initial DOT configuration, Congresspeople did not emphasize the potential links between intercity railroads and urban transit (even though some of the large railroads ran commuter rail operations then subsidized by HUD). Staff Memorandum. Organization of Urban Mass Transportation Program, November 4, 1967, § Transportation Study, Organization for Urban Mass Transit, ¶ 199, JCG; Hearings on S.3010, to Establish a Department of Transportation, before the Senate Committee on Government Operations, March 30, 1966, § IS 3-2 Transportation, ¶ 20, RCW.


100. Draft of Presidential signing of Transportation bill. Written by Alan Boyd, October 12, 1966, § FG 175/DOT August 1, 1966-October 12, 1966, ¶ 257, FG 175, WHCF, LBJ.


102. HUD and DOT (in a pre-formation mode) considered a study in Fall 1966, including with Daniel P. Moynihan. Letter from Daniel P. Moynihan, Director, Joint Center for Urban Studies of MIT and Harvard, to Joseph Califano, November 28, 1966, § FG 175/DOT October 18 1966-February 16, 1967, ¶ 258, FG 175, WHCF, LBJ; Report to the President on Urban Transportation Organization. HUD and DOT, February 19, 1968, § IS 3-1 Transfer of HUD to DOT, ¶ 19, RCW.

103. The Organization and Location of Urban Transportation Functions in the Executive Branch. HUD, April 4, 1967, § IS 3-1 Transfer of HUD to DOT, ¶ 19, RCW.

104. Memo from Joseph Califano to Robert C. Weaver, October 18, 1966, § HUD Proposals, ¶ 64, Office Files of Joseph A. Califano, LBJ.

105. New Directions in Mass Transportation. Address by Charles M. Haar, American Transit Association Convention, San Francisco, 10:30 a.m., October 3, 1966, § IS 3-2 Transportation, ¶ 20, RCW.

106. Memo from Charles M. Haar to Joseph Califano, March 22, 1968; Memo from W. Marvin Watson, Special Assistant to the President, to the President, April 16, 1968, both in § FG 170 March 22, 1968-May 31, 1968, ¶ 254, FG, WHCF, LBJ; Memo from Charles M. Haar to the President, August 18, 1967, § HUD, ¶ 20, Office Files of Harry McPherson, LBJ.


109. Portions of this text were underlined in the original document. Memo from Robert C. Weaver to Joseph Califano, September 27, 1967, § IS 3-1 Transfer of HUD to DOT, ¶ 19, RCW.

110. Speech by Charles M. Haar, to the HUD-Sponsored Urban Transit Seminar, West Virginia University, July 20, 1967, § IS 3-1 Transfer of HUD to DOT, ¶ 19, RCW.

111. Weaver claimed that HUD’s efforts were broad and applied to most urban environments. Letter from Jonathan B. Bingham, Congressman [representing Bronx], to the President, March 27, 1967, § TN 2 October 19, 1966-, ¶ 5, TN 2, WHCF, LBJ.


115. Memo sent from Robert C. Weaver to Robert C. Wood, April 12, 1968, § IS 3 Metropolitan Development, ¶ 19, RCW.

117. Coordination of Peer Departments in Urban Affairs by HUD, the President’s Task Force on Government Organization. Arthur P. Solomon, Staff Associate [No date—likely in late 1966], § Coordination of Peer Departments in Urban Affairs by HUD—Solomon, § 255, JCG.


119. Letter from Governor of Massachusetts Endicott Peabody to Harrison A. Williams Jr., April 21, 1964, § Metro Affairs: Mass Transport (29 of 31), § 447, HAW; Memo from E. H. Holmes to Alan Boyd, June 22, 1967, 2, USD.


122. Letter from Harrison A. Williams Jr. to Andrew Gilbert, Chairman, Irrigation and Industrial Development Corporation, December 8, 1964, § Metro Affairs: Mass Transport (27 of 31), § 447, HAW.

123. Interview with Alan S. Boyd, Interviewer David G. McComb, December 18, 1968, 14, Oral Histories, LBJ; Memo from Alan Boyd to Joseph Califano, November 22, 1966, § Transportation, § 64, Office Files of Joseph A. Califano, LBJ.


125. Letter from Peter A. Lewis, Metropolitan Development, to Robert C. Weaver, December 8, 1967, § IS 3-1 Transfer of HUD to DOT, § 19, RCW.


127. Memo from Nathaniel J. Eiseman, Deputy Director Office of Budget, to Robert C. Weaver, August 16, 1967; Summary of Items of Interest in the House Report on the DOT Appropriation Bill, 1968, July 13, 1967, both in § IS 3-1 Transfer of HUD to DOT, § 19, RCW.

128. Memo from Thomas H. Floyd, Chairman, Urban Transportation Ad Hoc Legislative Committee and Acting Director, Division of Demonstration Programs and Studies, to Charles M. Haar, May 10, 1966, § HUD Proposals, § 64, Office Files of Joseph A. Califano, LBJ.

129. Haar noted that inadequate local planning under previous BPR projects had produced citizen outcries and protests, such as along Philadelphia’s waterfront. Appendix IV: Policy and Strategy Memorandum (HUD-DOT) of November 1966. Addressed to Robert C. Weaver from Charles M. Haar, November 1966, § IS 3-2 Transportation, § 20, RCW.

130. Letter from Robert C. Wood to Robert C. Weaver, March 16, 1967, § IS 3-2 Transportation, § 20, RCW; Legislative History on Location of Urban Mass Transportation Programs, HUD, April 4, 1967; The Organization and Location of Urban Transportation Functions in the Executive Branch, HUD, April 4, 1967; Memo from Charles M. Haar to Robert C. Weaver, Background Material for Your Talks with Secretary Boyd on the Division of Federal Transportation Programs Between HUD and DOT, April 6, 1967, all in § IS 3-1 Transfer of HUD to DOT, § 19, RCW.

131. Memo from Robert C. Wood to Robert C. Weaver, March 16, 1967, § IS 3-2 Transportation, § 20, RCW; Legislative History on Location of Urban Mass Transportation Programs, HUD, April 4, 1967; The Organization and Location of Urban Transportation Functions in the Executive Branch, HUD, April 4, 1967; Memo from Charles M. Haar to Robert C. Weaver, Background Material for Your Talks with Secretary Boyd on the Division of Federal Transportation Programs Between HUD and DOT, April 6, 1967, all in § IS 3-1 Transfer of HUD to DOT, § 19, RCW.

132. Letter from Robert C. Wood to Robert C. Weaver, March 16, 1967, § IS 3-2 Transportation, § 20, RCW; Legislative History on Location of Urban Mass Transportation Programs, HUD, April 4, 1967; The Organization and Location of Urban Transportation Functions in the Executive Branch, HUD, April 4, 1967; Memo from Charles M. Haar to Robert C. Weaver, Background Material for Your Talks with Secretary Boyd on the Division of Federal Transportation Programs Between HUD and DOT, April 6, 1967, all in § IS 3-1 Transfer of HUD to DOT, § 19, RCW.

133. See Mohl, “The Interstates and the Cities.”

134. Memo from Robert B. Shapiro to DOT General Council, June 24, 1967, 3-4, USD.


136. Memo from M. Cecil Mackey to the record, September 19, 1967, 2; Memo from Gordon M. Murray to Alan Boyd, August 31, 1967, 1, USD.

137. There were underlined portions in the original text. Memo from Robert C. Weaver to Joseph Califano, September 27, 1967, § IS 3-1 Transfer of HUD to DOT, § 19, RCW.
138. There were underlined portions in the original text. Memo from Alan Boyd to Joseph Califano, October 6, 1967, § IS 3-1 Transfer of HUD to DOT, ¶ 19, RCW.


140. Memo to Joseph Califano from Bureau of the Budget, November 6, 1967; Memo from William D. Carey, Human Resources Programs Division, to Charles L. Schultze, November 6, 1967; Memo from Charles J. Zwick and Fred Bohen to Charles L. Schultze and Joseph Califano, November 6, 1967; Memo from Fred Bohen to Charles L. Schultze and Joseph Califano, November 6, 1967, all in § Transportation Study, Organization for Urban Mass Transit, ¶ 199, JCG.

141. Johnson was reluctant to sign the 1968 Federal-Aid Highway bill because he believed it overfunded highways. Memo to Joseph Califano from Bureau of the Budget, November 6, 1967; Memo from Matt Nimetz to Joseph Califano, November 7, 1967, both in § Transportation Study, Organization for Urban Mass Transit, ¶ 199, JCG; Interview with Charles L. Schultze, Interviewer David M. McComb, March 28, 1969, 55, Oral Histories, LBJ. Note that any effort to reduce transit’s status to a status below that of highways, as the highway administrator desired, was countered by internal agreement at DOT that the president desired transit to be on par with roads administratively in DOT. Memo from Alan Dean to DOT team, December 16, 1967, USD.

142. Staff Memorandum: Coordination of Urban Transportation Programs, November 11, 1967, § Transportation Study, Organization for Urban Mass Transit, ¶ 199, JCG.


145. Boyd, Weaver, and Wood met with Califano and Schultze the week before. Weaver asked Califano to “talk to Charlie Haar to soften the blow”; Haar had not abandoned the idea of HUD-managed transit. Memo from Joseph Califano to the President, December 1, 1967, § TN 2 October 20, 1965-December 31, 1967, ¶ 3, TN2, WHCF, LBJ; Report to the President on Urban Transportation Organization, HUD and DOT, February 19, 1968, § IS 3-1 Transfer of HUD to DOT, ¶ 19, RCW; Letter from Charles L. Schultze to Alan Boyd and Joseph Califano, January 6, 1968, § Transportation Study, Organization for Urban Mass Transit, ¶ 199, JCG.

146. Although, ultimately, the Senate Banking Committee retained jurisdiction over transit, even as the program shifted to DOT. Letter from Wright Patman, William A. Barrett, and William B. Widnall, Congressmen on the Committee on Banking and Currency, to the President, January 23, 1968, § TN 2 October 19, 1966—, ¶ 5, TN 2, WHCF, LBJ.


150. Letter from Alan L. Dean, Assistant Secretary for Administration, DOT, to Deputy Director, Bureau of the Budget, February 16, 1968; Letter from Alan L. Dean to Alan Boyd, February 3, 1968, both in Microfiche roll 147, Bureau of the Budget, Office of Executive Management, LBJ.
The rollout went well; John Lindsay noted that “from the viewpoint of urban planning, considerations of highways and air travel cannot be divorced from mass transit.” White House, Release to the House and Senate, February 26, 1968, § IS 3-1 Transfer of HUD to DOT, ‡ 19, RCW; Letter from New York Mayor John Lindsay to the President, February 27, 1968, § FG 175-9—Urban Mass Transit Administration, ‡ 260, FG 175, WHCF, LBJ; Memo from President Johnson to the Congress, March 12, 1968, § FG 170 January 4, 1968-March 21, 1968, ‡ 254, FG, WHCF, LBJ.

Memo from John Robson, to Charles M. Haar, June 8, 1968; Memo from Vincent J. Hearing to Robert C. Wood and Charles M. Haar, June 17, 1968, both in § IS 3-1 Transfer of HUD to DOT, ‡ 19, RCW; Memo from Bill Merritt to Charles M. Haar, June 16, 1968, § IS 3 Metropolitan Development, ‡ 19, RCW.


Letter from M. Cecil Mackey, Acting Secretary for DOT, to Honorable George Fallon, Chairman, Committee on Public Works, House, April 25, 1968; Letter from Jacob K. Javits to Robert C. Weaver, April 17, 1968, both in § IS 3-1 Transfer of HUD to DOT, ‡ 19, RCW.

Letter from Alan Boyd and Robert C. Weaver to Jacob K. Javits, May 4, 1968, § IS 3-1 Transfer of HUD to DOT, ‡ 19, RCW.

Letter from Joseph Califano to the President, August 22, 1968, § LE/FA 3 August 1, 1968-, ‡ 40, LA/FA 2, WHCF, LBJ.

DOT officials claimed willingness to work with HUD on Model Cities and New Towns. Letter from Alan Boyd to Under Secretary, Assistant Secretaries, General Counsel, Administrators FAA, FHWA, FRA, UMTA, September 13, 1968; News release, DOT, September 13, 1968, both in § Reports: Program Priorities—Mass Transportation, March 1967-December 1968, ‡ 61, ASB; Letter from Paul L. Sitton, to Patrick Healy, Executive Director, National League of Cities, January 15, 1969, § TN 2 October 19, 1966-, ‡ 5, TN 2, WHCF, LBJ; Letter from Vincent J. Hearing to Robert C. Weaver, October 25, 1968, § IS 3 Metropolitan Development, ‡ 19, RCW; Memo from John Robson to FHWA Administrator, UMTA Administrator, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy Development, September 19, 1968, § IS 3-1 Transfer of HUD to DOT, ‡ 19, RCW.

Letter from Charles M. Haar to Robert C. Wood, September 24, 1968; Staff Bulletin, Department of Housing and Urban Development, 68-101, Metropolitan Development Reorganization, October 29, 1968; Memo: Author unclear, but sent from Robert C. Weaver to Robert C. Wood, April 12, 1968, all in § IS 3 Metropolitan Development, ‡ 19, RCW; Letter from Robert C. Weaver to Alan Boyd, April 26, 1968; Letter from Charles M. Haar to Robert C. Weaver, May 1, 1968, both in § IS 3-1 Transfer of HUD to DOT, ‡ 19, RCW.

At the Bureau of the Budget, similarly, there was confusion about why HUD was continuing to finance transit. Memo from Charles M. Haar to Robert C. Weaver, November 13, 1968, § IS 3-2 Transportation—File II, ‡ 20, RCW; Interview with Charles Zwick, Interviewer David McComb, April 25, 1969, 21, Oral Histories, LBJ.

News release from Office of the Secretary, Department of Transportation, September 19, 1968, § IS 3 Metropolitan Development, ‡ 19, RCW.


Author Biography